

# Position on the Priorities of Climate Policy in Ukraine and the world before the UN Climate Change Conference (COP28)

From 30 November to 12 December 2023, the United Arab Emirates will host the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This is a key international platform for countering the climate crisis, as well as an important lever of influence on the national policy of countries. All 195 Parties to the Paris Agreement, including Ukraine, are participating in the Conference to synchronize their climate policies and find solutions to limit the increase in average global temperature to 1.5°C from the pre-industrial period.

This position presents a vision of the decisions that must be adopted at the international and national level in Ukraine to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. The recommendations of the report of the Global Stocktake<sup>1</sup> are taken into account, as well as important recommendations within the framework of the previous negotiations.

In addition to the challenges related to the climate crisis, Ukraine also faces an urgent challenge, i.e. Russia's war against Ukraine. The armed aggression, which has been ongoing since 2014, directly affects the climate crisis and, accordingly, the entire world. **The climate crisis and war have a direct connection and one root, which is fossil fuels.** A significant part of Russia's federal budget is formed precisely at the expense of the export of fossil fuels.<sup>2</sup> That is why climate negotiations, among other things, are also a lever of influence on the actions of the aggressor and an indirect tool for preventing the financing of aggression with the help of fossil fuels in the future. Therefore, the leading message of the delegation should be to promote the phase-out of fossil fuels.

## Regarding Global Climate Policy Priorities

### 1. Phasing out of fossil fuels

Despite the widespread recognition by the international community that the burning of fossil fuels is the main cause of the climate crisis, during decades of climate negotiations, the Parties **have not been able to agree on a complete phase out of fossil fuels.** The first moves towards phasing out

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<sup>1</sup> Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake, (accessed at: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023\\_09\\_adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf))

<sup>2</sup> Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, "One year on, who is funding Russia's war in Ukraine?", (accessed at: [https://energyandcleanair.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/CREA\\_One-year-on-who-is-funding-Russias-war-in-Ukraine.pdf](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/CREA_One-year-on-who-is-funding-Russias-war-in-Ukraine.pdf))

took place during COP26, when the Glasgow Climate Pact managed to record the need in “accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.”<sup>3</sup>

During last year’s Conference of the Parties (COP27), a proposal to phase out fossil fuels received the support of more than 80 countries, but countries rich in oil and gas opposed such an initiative. A similar challenge is expected this year. Besides, some countries whose economies depend on fossil fuels want to focus on developing technologies to capture CO<sub>2</sub> emissions rather than on reducing fossil fuel use.

At the G20 summit in September 2023, the G20 countries also failed to reach an agreement on phasing out fossil fuels and reducing emissions. However, they did manage to reach an important agreement on the intention to work on tripling the world’s renewable energy capacity by 2030.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the G20 countries continue to make significant investments in fossil fuel subsidies, reaching a record USD 7 trillion in the last year alone.<sup>5</sup> In addition, in the G20 countries, which are responsible for 80% of global coal emissions,<sup>6</sup> global coal emissions per capita for the period from 2015 to 2022 did not decrease but rather increased from 1 ton of CO<sub>2</sub> in 2015 to 1.1 ton of CO<sub>2</sub> in 2022.<sup>7</sup>

This year, it is expected that the topic of phasing out fossil fuels will again be discussed by the Parties. Thus, the EU countries have long since started work on forming their own position for COP28. In particular, the Council of the EU highlighted<sup>8</sup> the need to urgently reduce dependence on fossil fuels<sup>9</sup> and their subsidies, as well as the need to accelerate the use of renewable energy sources. Ukraine should support the position of the Council of the EU and unite in efforts to phase out fossil fuels.

Therefore, it is important that during COP28, the Parties **approve the phase out of fossil fuels as the main way to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement and define the time frame for the transformation and the renunciation of fossil fuel subsidies.**

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<sup>3</sup> Glasgow Climate Pact (Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on its third session, held in Glasgow from 31 October to 13 November 2021), (accessed at: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021\\_10\\_add1\\_adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_10_add1_adv.pdf)), p. 5, clause 36

<sup>4</sup> Matteo Civillini, "G20 leaders strike renewables deal, stall on fossil fuels", (accessed at: <https://climatechangenews.com/2023/09/09/g20-leaders-strike-renewables-deal-stall-on-fossil-fuels/>)

<sup>5</sup> International Monetary Fund Blog, "Fossil Fuel Subsidies Surged to Record \$7 Trillion", (accessed at: <https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/08/24/fossil-fuel-subsidies-surged-to-record-7-trillion>)

<sup>6</sup> Ember, "G20 Per Capita Coal Power Emissions 2023", (accessed at: <https://ember-climate.org/app/uploads/2023/09/G20-Per-Capita-Coal-Power-Emissions-2023.pdf>), p. 3

<sup>7</sup> Ember, "G20 Per Capita Coal Power Emissions 2023", (accessed at: <https://ember-climate.org/app/uploads/2023/09/G20-Per-Capita-Coal-Power-Emissions-2023.pdf>), p. 9

<sup>8</sup> Council of the EU, "Preparations for the 28<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties (COP28) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change", (accessed at: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14285-2023-INIT/en/pdf>)

<sup>9</sup> Note: in its position, the Council of the EU calls for the global phase out of **unabated fossil fuels**. However, at the same time, the EU Council noted that emission abatement technologies exist at limited scale and are to be used to reduce emissions mainly from hard to abate sectors and emphasized that they should not be used to delay climate action.

## 2. Settlement of liability for climate damage from international armed conflicts

Although countries have committed to annually report and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris Agreement, certain categories of emissions data remain optional. Among them are direct and indirect emissions of greenhouse gases from military operations, which, according to calculations, may amount to about 5.5% of global emissions.<sup>10</sup>

Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine is no exception. Its impact on the climate can only be indirectly reflected in the national reports of countries. However, **in the first year of the war alone, the amount of greenhouse gas emissions associated with the russian invasion is estimated to reach 120 million tons of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent.**<sup>11</sup> This is practically equivalent to the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions generated during the same period in Belgium.<sup>12</sup> Russia should be formally responsible for emissions during the war, as well as for future emissions from rebuilding Ukraine's infrastructure destroyed as a result of hostilities (about 50 million tons of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent).<sup>13</sup> Methodology for accounting for such emissions and obligations is a difficult task and work on preparing proposals should begin as soon as possible. Ukraine should work with other Parties to the Convention that are ready to offer formats for accounting for "military emissions."

Therefore, during COP28, we consider it **important to start discussions to work out a solution regarding responsibility for emissions related to international armed conflicts.**

At the same time, we consider it **inadmissible to continue the inclusion of emissions (not related to military operations) from the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and other temporarily occupied territories) to the emissions cadastre of the russian federation.**

## 3. Climate justice: adequate climate finance to countries that need it

120 developing countries are responsible for less than 20% of the global carbon dioxide emissions that have caused the climate crisis.<sup>14</sup> However, the populations of these countries often suffer the most devastating effects of climate change: flooding, natural disasters, etc. Such countries urgently need resources to strengthen their resilience and adaptive capacity, to compensate for losses and damages.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Conflict and Environment Observatory, "Estimating the Military's Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions" (accessed at: [https://ceobs.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/SGR-CEOBS\\_Estimating\\_Global\\_Military\\_GHG\\_Emissions.pdf](https://ceobs.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/SGR-CEOBS_Estimating_Global_Military_GHG_Emissions.pdf))

<sup>11</sup> Climate damage caused by russia's war in Ukraine: 24 February 2022 – 23 February 2023, (accessed at: <https://en.ecoaction.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/clim-damage-by-russia-war-12months.pdf>), p. 6  
*Note: 120 million tons of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent includes 50.2 million tons of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent from reconstruction*

<sup>12</sup> Climate damage caused by russia's war in Ukraine: 24 February 2022 – 23 February 2023, (accessed at: <https://en.ecoaction.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/clim-damage-by-russia-war-12months.pdf>), p. 6

<sup>13</sup> Climate damage caused by russia's war in Ukraine: 24 February 2022 – 23 February 2023, (accessed at: <https://en.ecoaction.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/clim-damage-by-russia-war-12months.pdf>), p. 12

<sup>14</sup> Harald Fuhr, "The rise of the Global South and the rise in carbon emissions", (accessed at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1954901>)

<sup>15</sup> World Resources Institute, "4 Actions Vulnerable Countries Need from COP28", (accessed at: <https://www.wri.org/technical-perspectives/actions-vulnerable-countries-need-un-climate-summit>)

One of the attempts to solve this problem was the creation of the Loss and Damage Fund following the results of COP27.<sup>16</sup> This Fund is intended to be a source of payments of the compensation for damages suffered by developing countries as a result of climate change.

Countries responsible for significant global emissions of greenhouse gases in the past and today cannot ignore their responsibility to vulnerable developing countries suffering the effects of climate change, nor can they deny their role in creating the situation.

Regardless of its current capabilities, Ukraine should **support the global call to accelerate the resolution of the issue of climate justice by streamlining the activities of the Loss and Damage Fund**, namely:

- **Determine the list of countries that will fill this Fund.** These should be developed countries responsible for the main emissions of greenhouse gases in the past, as well as countries responsible for the present significant volumes of emissions. **Ukraine should enter this list, however, with a deferment of the obligation to pay funds in connection with the war.**
- **Determine clear sources of funds coming to the Fund from the Parties** and how the activities of the Fund will be coordinated with other, already existing, UNFCCC funds (Special Climate Change Fund, Adaptation Fund).
- **Determine the role of private financial institutions in the Fund.**

It is not the first year the Parties face the issue of funding deficit. At COP26, developed countries reaffirmed their commitment to allocate USD 100 billion annually to developing countries for climate change mitigation and adaptation.<sup>17</sup> However, these financial commitments have not yet been fully met. Besides, the 2022 study shows<sup>18</sup> that the target amount mentioned above is not sufficient. Thus, by 2025, around USD 1 trillion per year will be needed to successfully support developing countries, and by 2030, this figure will increase to USD 1.7 trillion per year.

#### 4. Ecosystems and biodiversity preservation

Preservation and restoration of ecosystems is an integral part of achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. Therefore, harmonization of the climate goals with the goals for biodiversity preservation, which are provided for by the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework<sup>19</sup> adopted in December 2022, is also an important task for the UNFCCC Parties.

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<sup>16</sup> UN, "Establishing a dedicated fund for loss and damage", (accessed at: <https://unfccc.int/establishing-a-dedicated-fund-for-loss-and-damage>)

<sup>17</sup> Glasgow Climate Pact (Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on its third session, held in Glasgow from 31 October to 13 November 2021), (accessed at: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021\\_10\\_add1\\_adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_10_add1_adv.pdf)), p. 6, clause 43

<sup>18</sup> The World bank, "What You Need to Know About How CCDRs Estimate Climate Finance Needs", (accessed at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/03/13/what-you-need-to-know-about-how-ccdrs-estimate-climate-finance-needs#:~:text=The%20report%20finds%20that%20around,developing%20countries%20other%20than%20China>)

<sup>19</sup> Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, (accessed at: <https://www.cbd.int/article/cop15-final-text-kunming-montreal-gbf-221222>)

The key period for this agreement should be the Global Stocktake (GST),<sup>20</sup> the first cycle of which should be completed at this year's COP28. Within its framework, **the Parties should strengthen joint actions to address climate change and biodiversity preservation**, in particular by better integrating these actions into their updated national climate goals, including nationally determined contributions, long-term strategies and adaptation strategies.

- Countries should adopt and use **clear standards for accurate and transparent reporting of changes in the LULUCF** (Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry) sector. This can happen due to the adoption by the Parties of the UN “System of Environmental Economic Accounting — Ecosystem Accounts” (UNSEEA-EA) as the main tool for planning nature-oriented climate actions, which would reflect changes in the state of the ecosystem, their stability, as well as the possibility and duration of carbon storage.
- Besides, before the next round of nationally determined contributions, **it is important to align** countries' climate ambitions with the goals of the Kunming-Montreal Global Framework Agreement on Biodiversity. In particular, this refers to the need to respond appropriately to reduce the intensity of biodiversity loss factors and expand the network of protected areas within the framework of national plans and strategies for the protection and restoration of natural ecosystems.
- At the same time, **protecting and restoring ecosystems cannot be used to offset greenhouse gas emissions**. This must happen simultaneously with a rapid phase-out of all fossil fuels and a sharp reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in all sectors.

## Regarding the Priorities of Ukraine's Climate Policy

### 1. Climate neutrality by 2050

The results of this year's Global Stocktake showed<sup>21</sup> that the world is far from achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and the window of opportunity is closing. Therefore, Ukraine should set ambitious goals and take effective measures in the direction of de-carbonization of its economy. On 23 June 2022, Ukraine received the status of a candidate for EU membership, which provides for the implementation of European legislation, including the European Green Deal, which aims to achieve climate neutrality on the European continent by 2050.

Therefore, taking into account the commitments undertaken, Ukraine must officially **approve the course for climate neutrality by 2050**.

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<sup>20</sup> UNCC, Why the Global Stocktake is a Critical Moment for Climate Action, (accessed at: <https://unfccc.int/topics/global-stocktake/about-the-global-stocktake/why-the-global-stocktake-is-a-critical-moment-for-climate-action>)

<sup>21</sup> Technical dialogue of the first global stocktake, (accessed at: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023\\_09\\_adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2023_09_adv.pdf))

## 2. Climate-friendly reconstruction of infrastructure and economy

### 2.1. Prevention of emissions during reconstruction

Ukraine has the opportunity not only to join the pan-European goal of building a climate-neutral continent by 2050 but also to become a model of sustainable climate-friendly reconstruction with the best approaches and technologies of the 21st century. This is important because, according to calculations,<sup>22</sup> a significant part of the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the war will occur during reconstruction.

That is why one of the important aspects is the construction of new buildings following the new standards, which will contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In the country, standards should be introduced that will establish requirements that new buildings should be built with the highest class of energy efficiency and with the use of energy from renewable energy sources like solar power plants with storage capacities, heat pumps (the standard of buildings with close to zero energy consumption or buildings with zero emissions). State sectoral strategies, changes in standards, decisions on issuing permits for activities, as well as regional development plans, should be based on the goal of transitioning the economy to a climate-neutral one by 2050.

Therefore, it is necessary to **introduce mechanisms that would ensure climate-neutral reconstruction**, in particular, by introducing new energy efficiency standards for buildings.

### 2.2. Adaptation to climate change

Each of the regions of Ukraine is unique in terms of microclimate, landscape, and geographical location. That is why the climate crisis can have different manifestations in each of the regions. Bearing this in mind, it is necessary to assess the risks posed by climate change and develop specific adaptation measures precisely at the level of territorial communities.<sup>23</sup>

Because of the Russian armed aggression, the need for reconstruction arose in many Ukrainian communities after the occupation and the destruction caused. Ukrainian Government is carrying out the planning for the post-war reconstruction of communities.<sup>24</sup> It is important that this planning, as well as direct actions to rebuild the infrastructure of settlements, take into account climatic aspects, in particular in the context of adaptation. Strategic documents on the recovery of communities and their climate policies should be based on the goals approved by Ukraine in the Strategy for Environmental Security and Adaptation to Climate Change until 2030,<sup>25</sup> goals of the Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal.

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<sup>22</sup> Climate damage caused by Russia's war in Ukraine: 24 February 2022 – 23 February 2023 (accessed at: <https://en.ecoaction.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/clim-damage-by-russia-war-12months.pdf>), p. 12

<sup>23</sup> Ecoaction, "Why Adaptation to Climate Change Matters in Green Post-war Rebuilding of Communities", (accessed at: <https://ecoaction.org.ua/adaptatsia-vazhlyva.html>)

<sup>24</sup> Selection meeting of the Vice-Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine – Minister for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine with heads of regional state administrations, (accessed at: <https://decentralization.gov.ua/news/16851?page=3>)

<sup>25</sup> CMU, "Strategy of environmental security and adaptation to climate change until 2030" (accessed at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1363-2021-%D1%80#Text>)

Therefore, **when planning reconstruction, it is necessary to take into account the vulnerability of communities to climate change**, as well as to develop specific proposals for the mechanisms of integration of climate change adaptation measures in the processes of post-war reconstruction of communities and cities.

### 3. Strengthening Ukraine's participation in global climate initiatives

#### *3.1. Presentation of the plan to abandon coal in the energy sector (Powering Past Coal Alliance initiative)*

In June 2023, the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine confirmed its intention to close all state-owned coal-fired power plants by 2035.<sup>26</sup> For the first time, Ukraine announced such intentions at the end of 2021 at the COP26 climate conference in the UK. Since then, the Ukrainian coal industry has suffered significant destruction due to Russian attacks, and the energy system has become vulnerable due to the high centralization of generation capacity. That is why reconstruction according to the old model has lost its point. During COP28, Ukraine can once again emphasize its **readiness to phase out coal in energy by 2035 and ensure a phased phase-out in a fair way**: with a clear plan to close coal plants, educational programs and opportunities for employment and social guarantees for coal workers, as well as economic diversification of mining communities.

Fair transformation is an important element of the National Energy and Climate Plan, the development of which will continue in Ukraine in the coming months.<sup>27</sup> **Conducting proper open consultations with local authorities, civil society organizations and experts** will help make this plan effective, as well as show Ukraine's leadership as a member of the Powering Past Coal Alliance.

#### *3.2. Plan to reduce methane emissions (Global Methane Pledge initiative)*

In 2021, more than 100 countries, including Ukraine, joined<sup>28</sup> the Global Methane Pledge initiative, which envisages reducing methane emissions by 30% by 2030 from the 2020 level. For Ukraine, the reduction of methane emissions is possible through the implementation of climate measures in the oil and gas and coal sectors, agriculture, as well as the establishment of a waste management system.

In July 2023, a draft of the CMU order "On the approval of the plan of measures for the implementation of the Updated Nationally Determined Contribution of Ukraine to the Paris Agreement

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<sup>26</sup> Powering Past Coal Alliance, "Amid war, Ukraine recommit to phasing out coal power by 2035", (accessed at: <https://poweringpastcoal.org/press-releases/amid-war-ukraine-recommits-to-phasing-out-coal-power-by-2035/>)

<sup>27</sup> Ministry of Energy of Ukraine, "The National Energy and Climate Plan will be an important step for EU integration and sustainable post-war recovery of Ukraine", (accessed at: <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/natsionalnyi-plan-z-enerhetyky-ta-klimatu-stane-vazhlyvym-krokom-dlia-intehratsii-v-ies-ta-staloho-povoiennoho-vidnovlennia-ukrainy>)

<sup>28</sup> Ecoaction, "Ukraine has joined the Global Initiative to Reduce Methane Emissions. What does it mean?", (accessed at: <https://ecoaction.org.ua/global-methane-pledge.html>)

until 2030"<sup>29</sup> was published. It does not fully reflect the provisions of the adopted<sup>30</sup> Plan of measures for the implementation of Ukraine's climate policy within the framework of participation in the global initiative to reduce methane emissions "Global Methane Pledge." It is important to complete **the development of national legislation for the successful implementation of the approved Plan to reduce methane emissions.**

As part of activities to reduce methane emissions, Ukraine must report on sectoral measures implemented since 2021 and the adoption in 2023 of the Action Plan for the Implementation of Ukraine's Climate Policy as part of participation in the global initiative "Global Methane Pledge."<sup>31</sup> Besides, it is **necessary to intensify work to reduce methane emissions** in all relevant sectors following the EU Strategy.<sup>32</sup>

### *3.3. Declaration on forestry and other land use*

At the Conference of the Parties in Glasgow (COP26) in 2021, Ukraine signed the Declaration on Forests and Land Use.<sup>33</sup> However, since then, no significant progress has been made in the direction of implementing this declaration. Only in July 2023, the State Agency of Forest Resources of Ukraine developed a draft of the Law of Ukraine "On Attracting Investments and Economic Stimulation of the Implementation of Afforestation Measures and Forest Management."<sup>34</sup> This draft law should regulate the issue and circulation of carbon certificates and promote the preservation of unaccounted forests on abandoned agricultural lands and the creation of new forests in a climate-friendly and biodiversity-friendly way.

It is important that the draft law introduces mechanisms for practical implementation, as well as minimizes the risks of destruction of natural territories under the guise of implementing climate measures. **At COP28, Ukraine should present a clear plan that would demonstrate readiness to implement the provisions of the Declaration on Forests and Land Use.**

At the international level, for the timely and fair implementation of the goals of the Declaration to stop deforestation and land degradation by 2030, **the countries that are signatories to the**

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<sup>29</sup> Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine, "Notice on the publication of the final draft of the order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On the approval of the plan of measures for the implementation of the Updated Nationally Determined Contribution of Ukraine to the Paris Agreement until 2030", [accessed at: <https://mepr.gov.ua/povidomlennya-pro-oprylyudnennya-dooopratsovanogo-proyektu-rozporядzhennya-kabinetu-ministriv-ukrayiny-pro-shvalennya-planu-zahodiv-z-realizatsiyi-onovlenogo-natsionalno-vyznachenogo-vnesku-ukrayiny-d/>]

<sup>30</sup> Comments of "Ecoaction Centre for Environmental Initiatives" NGO to the revised draft of the CMU order "On the approval of the plan of measures for the implementation of the Updated Nationally determined contribution of Ukraine to the Paris Agreement until 2030", (accessed at: <https://ecoaction.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/plan-diy-nvv-2023-komentari.pdf>)

<sup>31</sup> CMU, Order "On the approval of the plan of measures for the implementation of the climate policy of Ukraine within the framework of participation in the global initiative to reduce methane emissions "Global Methane Pledge", (accessed at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/607-2023-%D1%80#Text>)

<sup>32</sup> EU, Methane emissions, (accessed at: [https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/methane-emissions\\_en](https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/methane-emissions_en)); Dixi Group, "EU Strategy on reducing methane emissions", (accessed at: [https://dixigroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/dixi\\_group\\_methane\\_policy\\_brief.pdf](https://dixigroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/dixi_group_methane_policy_brief.pdf))

<sup>33</sup> Ecoaction, "Ukraine joined the Declaration on Forests and Land Use. Will it save the forests?", (accessed at: <https://ecoaction.org.ua/deklaratsia-pro-lisy-ta-zemlekorystuvannia.html>)

<sup>34</sup> State Agency of Forest Resources of Ukraine, "Legislative activity in the sphere of implementation of investment attraction mechanisms for forest restoration and afforestation", (accessed at: <https://forest.gov.ua/news/zakonotvorcha-diialnist-u-sferi-zaprovadzhennia-mekhanizmiv-zaluchennia-investytsii-dlia-vidnovlennia-lisiv-ta-lisorozvedennia>)



**Declaration (including Ukraine) should support the creation of an accountability system for this declaration (Glasgow Declaration Accountability Framework) at COP28.** This framework will contribute to achieving the purpose of the Declaration by establishing mandatory reporting, enhanced monitoring, financial commitments, and agreeing on common standards and expected results.

### *3.4. Beyond Oil & Gas Alliance (BOGA)*

Given the European Union's stance on phasing out all fossil fuels and the need to strengthen energy security through the energy transition, **Ukraine could join the BOGA countries, which is an international coalition of governments and partners working together to promote the phasing out of oil and gas production.** The coalition includes Denmark, France, Sweden, Ireland, Costa Rica and other national and regional governments that have signed the BOGA Declaration.<sup>35</sup> In doing so, they have committed to work to limit oil and gas production and plan for a fair, equitable and controlled phased phase-out of the production of these fossil fuels.

### *3.5. Kunming-Montreal Global Framework Agreement on Biodiversity*

According to the Kunming-Montreal Global Framework Agreement on Biodiversity, adopted in December 2022, at least 30% of terrestrial, freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems, especially the most ecologically valuable, must be effectively protected by 2030 through ecologically representative, well-connected and fairly managed systems of protected areas. Besides, the agreement calls for minimizing the impacts of climate change and ocean acidification on biodiversity through climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Ukraine needs to update its national strategic and planning documents and legislation in the field of environmental protection and adaptation to climate change as soon as possible. In particular, **Ukraine needs to develop and approve a national strategy and action plan for biodiversity preservation until 2030 within the next 1–2 years. This is critically important both in the framework of the further implementation of the goals of the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Agreement, which should be used as a strategic plan for the implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity and its protocols for 2022–2030, as well as for the post-war restoration of nature of Ukraine.**

## **4. Carbon markets**

Trading in quotas for greenhouse gas emissions is one of the most discussed parts of the Paris Rulebook, but the least finalized. During negotiations at COP27, the final decisions caused outrage among public organizations. Under Article 6.2 “transferred mitigation outcomes,” countries can buy and sell emission allowances from each other to meet their goals under the Paris Agreement. This article also allowed the marking of information as confidential, which creates risks for double accounting of

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<sup>35</sup> The Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance Declaration, (accessed at: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/176fTn0z5aNr-vhUecAsLOD8Jg110dQMF/view>)

emission reductions, for certain types of carbon units.<sup>36</sup> Such initiatives can become the basis of greenwashing<sup>37</sup> and put at risk the achievement of the goals of the Paris Agreement.

During the negotiations, Ukraine should not support initiatives that call into question the transparency of monitoring under Article 6 and any initiatives that would allow the transfer of emission reduction units from past periods. **Ukraine's position regarding market-based bilateral instruments within the framework of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement must meet the criteria for additionality and the prevention of double accounting of emission reduction units.**

Article 6 market mechanisms must be accompanied by appropriate control tools. These tools should provide sufficient granularity in tracking the origin of reduction units to prevent double accounting: when multiple countries can use the same reduction unit to report on meeting national climate targets.

## 5. Involvement in the development of climate policy

Public organizations and national and local authorities participate in climate policy processes at various levels. At the same time, the local level cannot exist without the national level, and vice versa. The role of these stakeholders is critical to developing climate goals and measures that are consistent with the Paris Agreement and to ensure a sustainable and green post-war recovery for Ukraine.

Non-governmental organizations enjoy certain participation rights and specific opportunities to join the process. At the same time, it is important to create new tools that will provide an opportunity to better involve the local level in the process of creating policies.

During the next year, Ukraine must develop a new Nationally Determined Contribution until 2035, as well as adopt a National Energy and Climate Plan. In the framework of their development, it is important to ensure access and take into account the proposals of all interested parties, including civil society and representatives of local authorities.

## 6. Concerns related to the development of nuclear power

Nuclear energy can often be presented as climate-friendly, but investing in more nuclear capacity is not an effective solution to the climate crisis. According to a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published in March 2023, nuclear power is one of the two least effective options for mitigating climate change.<sup>38</sup>

Investing in nuclear energy, including for Ukraine, is detrimental for a number of reasons, including:

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<sup>36</sup> CMA.4, Decision, "Matters relating to cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement", (accessed at: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma4\\_auv\\_cma13\\_PA6.2.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma4_auv_cma13_PA6.2.pdf)), p. 16.

<sup>37</sup> Ecoaction, "Results of international climate negotiations in 2022 and the role of Ukraine in them", (accessed at: <https://ecoaction.org.ua/pidsumky-klim-peremovyn-2022.html>)

<sup>38</sup> Synthesis report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6). Summary for Policymakers, (accessed at: [https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syr/pdf/IPCC\\_AR6\\_SYR\\_SPM.pdf](https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf)), p. 28

- **The high cost and lengthy construction period.** The State Nuclear Energy Company "Energoatom" has signed a memorandum with Westinghouse Electric Company, planning to construct 9 new large nuclear units in Ukraine using the AP1000 technology.<sup>39</sup> It is crucial to note that Westinghouse's construction experience in the USA demonstrated a cost increase of at least twice (from 14 billion dollars to 30 billion for two units) and a delay of over 6 years. Therefore, in the construction of up to 9 similar power units, Ukraine risks losing significant funds and obtaining nuclear "construction delays" that will be unable to generate energy for the country for years.<sup>40</sup> In addition, funds will be needed for the handling of their waste and decommissioning of future nuclear reactors. There is a separate fund for decommissioning nuclear facilities in Ukraine, which accumulated 3525,668 million hryvnias over 12 years (as of the end of 2017). However, this amount will not be sufficient for the decommissioning of even one nuclear power unit.
- **Nuclear energy is more expensive than energy from renewable sources.** In recent years, renewable energy has sharply decreased in cost worldwide, while nuclear energy has become the most expensive. Currently, a megawatt-hour of nuclear energy costs several times more than the same amount of energy from solar or wind.<sup>41</sup>
- **Nuclear energy is not "climate friendly."** When considering the entire life cycle of nuclear power plants, including fuel production and waste disposal, the greenhouse gas emissions per unit of energy produced in nuclear power will be higher compared to renewable energy sources. In nuclear energy, it is 66g CO<sub>2</sub>e/kWh (while for wind energy it's 10g CO<sub>2</sub>e/kWh, and for solar – 22g CO<sub>2</sub>e/kWh).<sup>42</sup>
- **Nuclear energy produces a significant amount of nuclear waste.** According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimations, a 1 GW light-water reactor operating for one year generates 30–50 tons of spent nuclear fuel. The reactors planned by Westinghouse for construction in Ukraine fall into this category, each with a capacity of 1 GW. Thus, nine new reactors would create a substantial amount of nuclear waste, requiring significant funds and resources for maintenance, storage, and disposal.<sup>43</sup>
- **Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)** are not an efficient alternative. Even with the most optimistic forecasts, SMRs will not be able to generate energy for Ukraine for at least ten years. According to the model-based analysis of small modular reactors,<sup>44</sup> the SMR concept may face challenges in economic competitiveness compared to renewable energy sources. Despite certain advantages of SMRs, such as standardized design and modularity, they encounter high construction costs. Additionally, this technology does not address the waste problems caused by the nuclear industry and the need for fossil fuels.

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<sup>39</sup> Energoatom and Westinghouse expand cooperation, (accessed at: <https://www.energoatom.com.ua/app-eng/eng-0406221.html>)

<sup>40</sup> Ecoaction, "How new nuclear power units can harm Ukraine's security, economy and environment", (accessed at: <https://ecoaction.org.ua/iak-novi-aes-mozhut-nashkodyty.html>)

<sup>41</sup> Ecoaction, "How new nuclear power units can harm Ukraine's security, economy and environment", (accessed at: <https://ecoaction.org.ua/iak-novi-aes-mozhut-nashkodyty.html>)

<sup>42</sup> Ecoaction, "Nuclear Energy: Questions and Answers", (accessed at: [https://ecoaction.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/atomka\\_pyttannia\\_i\\_vidpovidi\\_web-2019.pdf](https://ecoaction.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/atomka_pyttannia_i_vidpovidi_web-2019.pdf))

<sup>43</sup> Ecoaction, "How much waste is produced by nuclear power and how it is processed", (accessed at: <https://ecoaction.org.ua/iaderni-vidkhody.html>)

<sup>44</sup> Björn Steigerwald et al., "Uncertainties in estimating production costs of future nuclear technologies: A model-based analysis of small modular reactors", (accessed at: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544223015980>)

Therefore, in its pursuit of climate goals, **Ukraine should not concentrate efforts and investments on the development of expensive nuclear energy capacities that would generate energy in the distant future. Instead, the focus should be on the development of decentralized renewable energy sources.**

## **7. Issues related to increasing export potential**

At the international Ukraine Recovery Conference 2023,<sup>45</sup> Government representatives emphasized that Ukraine will restore the economy with the use and development of “green” technologies: renewable energy sources and hydrogen, extraction of critical minerals and production of “green” steel. At the same time, such production is considered primarily from the point of view of increasing the country’s export potential, rather than ensuring its own energy transition.

As early as the spring of 2022, public organizations of Ukraine defined the principles of green reconstruction,<sup>46</sup> which stipulate that **the reconstruction should serve the needs of the residents of Ukraine first and foremost.** The process of reconstruction of Ukraine should be based on the development of a complex “green” economy, and not on the transformation of Ukraine into a raw material appendage for the needs of other countries.

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<sup>45</sup> Ukraine Recovery Conference 2023, (accessed at: <https://www.urc-international.com/urc-2023-info>)

<sup>46</sup> Green Reconstruction of Ukraine: Position of Civil Society, (accessed at: <https://ecoaction.org.ua/zelena-vidbudova-ukrainy-pozytsia-hromadskosti.html>)